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Motivation  
 Land use models 
− Travel demand forecast 
− Policy and project evaluation 
 Location choice 
− Preferences of decision makers (willingness to pay) 
− Friction between agents (location conflicts) not always 
considered 
 
 How are conflicts solved?  market 
− How to introduce this in a location choice model? 
 
(residential) Real estate market 
 Relatively scarce goods, almost inelastic demand 
 Normally: A household can live in only one 
dwelling and a dwelling can’t be used by more 
than one household 
 Competition for goods implies conflict 
 Conflict is solved through price adjustment  
− Changes in bid behavior of agents (bid-auction) 
− Changes in asking price of seller (choice) 
 
    interaction/transactions  market clearing (prices) 
 
Motivation - Market clearing 
Modeling approaches to solve market clearing: 
 
 Equilibrium (TRANUS, MEPLAN, MUSSA):  
− everyone is located or everything is sold 
− Aggregated 
− Cross sectional (no temporal dimension) 
− Fixed point problem 
 
 Dynamic disequilibrium (DELTA, IRPUD, ILUTE, UrbanSim): 
− Aggregated or disaggregated (partial-eq. or individual 
transactions) 
− Period-wise models 
− Great variety of approaches (simplified vs expensive) 
 
 
Market clearing 
 
Re-visiting equilibrium: 
 For each good (location) i find asking prices ri such that 
 
 
 
 For each household h, find bids Bhi such that  
 
 
 
 
 Demand (households) Supply (households) 
Idea  
 Adjustment of price depends on the interaction 
between demand and supply  change in 
expected utility and bidding behavior given the 
“state of the market” 
 
 Adjustment of expectation of agents before they 
enter the market can be based on the equilibrium 
approach to the problem. 
 
Proposal: Quasi-equilibrium approach 
 Auction market. Probability of agent h being best 
bidder for location i (at period t): 
 
 
 
 
 Price of location is the expected maximum bid 
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Quasi-equilibrium approach 
 Agents bid according to their preferences and their 
expected utility levels 
 
 
 Agents  perceive their probability of winning an 
auction as: 
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Quasi-equilibrium approach 
 Agents will bid according to their perception of the 
market conditions: they want to make sure they get 
a location but they also don’t want to over-bid 
 
 
 
 
 
          
 
Quasi-equilibrium approach 
Market clearing mechanism: 
 After adjusting their perceptions, all active households bid 
simultaneously for all locations available in the market in a 
period 
 If a household is the best bidder for more than one location, 
the maximum surplus location is chosen (given ri) 
 Empty locations and unlocated households interact in a new 
simultaneous auctions 
 Repeat until all households are located or all locations are 
occupied 
 move to next period. 
 
Market clearing algorithm* 
* Implemented in Python 
General framework algorithm* 
* Implemented in Python 
Case study – Area of study 
 151 communes and 4945 zones around Brussels     
(approx 1.2 million households) 
Case study – Data  
 Buildings: 4 types, average attributes at zone level 
(prices at commune level) 
 Households: Data from Census (2001, zone level) and 
a travel survey (2002, ~1300 observations)               
 Synthetic population 
 
 
Case study – estimation results 
model 
Hurtubia R. and Bierlaire M. (2012). Estimation of bid functions for 
location choice and price modeling with a latent variable approach. 
TRANSP-OR technical report. 
Case study – Simulation  results 
Observed and predicted population in 2008 
Case study – Simulation  results 
Case study – Simulation  results 
Variation in average income by commune 2001-2008 
Case study – Simulation  results 
Case study – Simulation  results 
 Increase in price vs increase in income 
Case study – Simulation  results 
Average real estate price by commune 2001 - 2008 
2001 2008 
Case study – Simulation  results 
Average real estate price by commune in 2008 
Proposed approach No market clearing 
Conclusions 
 Proposed approach accounts for adjustment of 
expectations of decision makers 
 Individual adjustments allow to implement an 
agent based model (no need to solve fixed point 
problem) 
 Results follow observed trends in spatial 
distribution of agents and evolution of prices 
 Not considering market clearing produces an 
underestimation of prices 
 
Thank you 
Model with price indicator 
Bid function 
(Bhi) 
Observed locations 
(choices) 
Explanatory 
variables (xh , zi) 
(latent) auction 
prices (ri) 
Observed prices 
 (Ri) 
Standard Logit choice model 
Auction price  
measurement 
model 
* Inspired by the Generalized Random Utility Model 
(Walker and Ben-Akiva, 2002) 
Model with price indicator 
 Structural equation for prices: 
 
 
 
 Measurement equation for prices: 
 
        
           
 
 
 Likelihood: 
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